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ABSTRACT
For more than three decades, the hypothetical constitutional right of informational privacy has
governed by assumption in the lower courts. The Supreme Court assumed the right into being in
two cases decided in 1977, Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
and persisted in assuming the right exists without deciding recently in NASA v. Nelson. In the
fertile murk of indecision, a hodgepodge of standards from interest-balancing all the way up to
strict scrutiny and a quasi-constitutional law of intuitions have arisen in the lower courts. What
constitutes a violation of this assumed right? The law struggles for a standard to define a
violation, but we know it when we feel it.
The Article contends that the very fuzziness of the hypothetical right comes from its nature as an
affectively saturated moral intuition regarding the proper balance of state and citizen power and
unease over incursions in times of social change. The Article is also about how to translate the
powerful moral intuition that the Constitution should have something to say (even if its text does
not quite say it) when the government does something creepy or outrageous with our intimate
information into respectable law that helps sort out the manifold meritless claims predicated on
privacy as knee-jerk reaction rather than right and allows policy innovation in the laboratories of
states and political branches. The article argues that privacy is a transitional lens that opens up
our vision of the liberty and freedoms safeguarded in the Constitution. We need not invent or
recognize a new atextual right of informational privacy. Rather the concept of informational
privacy is a lens that brings into focus a richer vision of the scope of textually inscribed
constitutional freedoms and what it means to vindicate them.
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Like many other desirable things not included in the Constitution,
“informational privacy” seems like a good idea—wherefore the People have
enacted laws . . . restricting the [G]overnment’s collection and use of
information. But it is up to the People to enact those laws, to shape them,
and, when they think it appropriate, to repeal them. A federal constitutional
right to “informational privacy” does not exist.
–Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring in NASA v. Nelson

1

INTRODUCTION
The hypothetical constitutional right to informational privacy has
governed by assumption in the lower courts for more than three decades. What constitutes a violation of this assumed right? The law
struggles to define the metes and bounds of the claimed constitu2
tional right and a standard for when it is transgressed. But we know
it when we feel it. This Article contends that the very fuzziness of the
hypothetical right comes from its nature as an affectively saturated
moral intuition regarding the proper balance of state and citizen
power and unease over incursions in times of social change. This Article is also about how to translate into respectable law the powerful
moral intuition that the Constitution should have something to say
(even if its text does not quite say it) when the government does
something creepy or outrageous with our intimate information.
Beyond assuming the right into being, the Supreme Court has
3
never found a violation. The three cases where the Court assumed a
1
2

3



131 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See, e.g., In re The Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (observing
that “neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has articulated a precise test for
an alleged violation of the right to confidentiality or defined the boundaries of that
right”).
See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751 (assuming without deciding that the Constitution protects
information privacy but holding that government background checks of NASA contractors do not violate the assumed right); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459–
60, 464 (1977) (rejecting President Richard Nixon’s claim that retention of his presidential papers violated his constitutional right to privacy, explaining that the archive and review of papers served “important national interests” and “less restrictive means” were un-
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hypothetical right to informational privacy did not ring the emotional meters of concern so typical in decisional privacy cases nor give
much colorable cause to find a violation, even assuming the right exists. After thirty-three years of silence, the most recent case involves a
claim described by Justice Scalia as “utter silliness”—that privacy
shields NASA government contractors working with very important,
expensive equipment from routine background checks into drug use
4
and treatment. The second case, decided in 1977, involved President Richard Nixon suing to prevent the archiving of the Presidential
papers of his administration because some personal papers may have
5
been mixed in and had to be screened out for return. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, was not sympathetic to Nixon, though he
was sympathetic to the hypothesized right of informational privacy in
6
unspecified other (and probably more compelling) contexts.
The only case that gave the Court significant pause—and the genesis of the assumed right—was the earliest case, Whalen v. Roe, also
decided in 1977, a few months before Nixon. Whalen involved a New
York statute that required record-keeping on purchases of certain
7
dangerous prescription drugs such as methadone and cocaine.
Then, as now, we had a wealth of literature warning that technological advances were shaking up the balance of power between citizen
and the state, enabling the state to maintain vast databases of infor8
mation in creepy fashion. The hypothetical right to informational

4
5
6
7

8



available to separate out private papers for return); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06
(1977) (explaining that even “[r]ecognizing that in some circumstances” the government
may “arguably” have a constitutional duty of nondisclosure for certain private information, New York’s scheme for surveilling the identity of persons purchasing prescription
medicines did not run afoul of “any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis added)).
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 769 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 430–32, 459.
See infra Part I.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 604–05. Cocaine, a drug currently considered such a scourge
that it is subject to mandatory minima when distributed even in low quantities, used to be
available by prescription. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2006) (setting tenyear mandatory minimum for possessing five kilograms or more of cocaine) with 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (2006) (providing that the ten-year mandatory minimum is
not triggered for marijuana unless 1000 kilograms or more are distributed).
Compare, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS,
AND DOSSIERS 43 (1971) (arguing that more than any other time in our history, Americans (back then, already) were being pervasively monitored and their electronic footprints tracked and stored because of advances in modern technology) and Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L.
REV. 837, 839–47, 853–62 (1971) (expressing concern over the rise of privately compiled
and governmentally compiled digital dossiers) with, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 21–55 (2010) (theo-
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privacy arose out of the intuition that there ought to be limits,
though they had not been overstepped yet. The Whalen Court concluded its opinion dismissing the claims of opiate buyers with “a final
word about issues we have not decided,” noting “[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or oth9
er massive government files.”
In the lower courts, where the right has flourished by assumption
over the decades, however, potential violations have been found,
most frequently in cases of alleged abuses of official power that register high on the outrage or creepiness emotional meter. Examples include law enforcement officials aggressively outing HIV-positive
people and trying to get them fired or harming their familial rela10
tions and the ability of their children to attend school; or threatening to disclose a teenager’s gay sexual orientation to his grandfather
after arresting him for suspected underage drinking, causing the
11
youth to commit suicide; or “gratuitously and unnecessarily” releasing humiliating details of a rape for no other purpose than to retaliate against the rape victim for criticizing an ineffectual investiga-

9
10

11

rizing a context-sensitive approach to curtailing the reach and threat of vast and deep information databases); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 13, 169–86 (2007) (proposing solutions to
rein in the technologically abetted surveillance state); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 8–9, 13–28, 43–46 (2004)
(theorizing the threat posed by the rise of aggregated and commercialized public record
information dissemination); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1472–1501 (2000) (illuminating the threat to privacy posed by the routinization of
information collection and the regularization of privacy-destroying technologies).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
See, e.g., Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1172–73, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a
potential violation where a probation officer tried to get a probationer fired from his job
at a café because she believed an HIV-positive person should not be in a food-preparation
position, but holding that the right was not clearly established at the time for purposes of
vitiating qualified immunity); A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting there is a constitutional right against information disclosure in a case where a police officer discovered a positive HIV test result in plaintiff’s wallet and told his sister,
housemates, and others, causing friends and family to shun the plaintiff); Doe v. Borough
of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 378–79, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a violation of the
constitutional right to information privacy in a civil suit against a police officer who
learned about the plaintiff’s husband’s seropositive HIV status during a traffic stop and
proceeded to track down the plaintiff’s neighbors, to tell them of his HIV status—
information that spread to the school of plaintiff’s children where some parents withdrew
their children and complained to the media).
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a police
officer’s assertion of qualified immunity due to factual insufficiency was not recognizable
in an interlocutory appeal of a civil suit).
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12

tion; or keeping a sex videotape featuring an extortion victim in a
desk drawer and allegedly viewing it, inviting other officers to view it,
and reproducing it for personal gratification rather than any public
13
purpose. The hypothetical right is so powerful that it has sometimes
overridden qualified immunity and been deemed “clearly established” despite the Supreme Court’s persistent eschewal of clearly re14
cognizing, much less establishing, any such right.
After the Court again ducked on deciding whether the right that
has flourished in the lower courts even exists, Justice Scalia wrote a
vigorous concurrence listing the harms of nondecision, including:
(1) an “Alfred Hitchcock line” of jurisprudence based on a coy assumption that gives the Court cover to pontificate about privacy when
it has no business further opining for lack of a constitutional right to
vindicate; (2) the harm to the Court’s image, and perhaps its selfrespect, done by the jurisprudential incoherence of trying to define a
hypothetical standard to govern a hypothetical right; (3) the lack of
guidance to lower courts; and (4) the risk of a dramatic increase in
the number of lawsuits asserting violations of the right to informational privacy that, though meritless, are “slightly less absurd” then
the Nelson claimants’ and therefore will drain judicial resources for
15
no good reason. The assumption has persisted for more than three
decades and the sky has not fallen, Justice Alito, for the majority,
16
wrote back in wry rejoinder. True enough, and the exchange makes
for lively reading.
But even if the sky has not fallen, the approach of regulation by
fog and assumption has costs beyond even those Justice Scalia enumerated. This Article argues that the additional harms include the
risk of chilling policy innovations by the political branches and an inability to, and an inconsistency in, separating out or even defining
meritorious claims from the vast pool of chaff that should be rapidly
sorted out at the threshold. The courts—including the Supreme

12

13

14
15
16

Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686–87 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a “cognizable” violation of
the right to privacy but not of a clearly established constitutional right sufficient to vitiate
qualified immunity, though warning that “public officials in this circuit will now be on notice that such a privacy right exists”).
James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1540–41, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding a violation of “a clearly established constitutional right [to privacy]” in light of a breach of the
duty of confidentiality and a promise of discretion in exchange for cooperation in an arson investigation).
See infra Parts II and III.
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 766–69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 756 n.10 (“[T]here is no evidence that those decisions have caused the sky to fall.”).
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Court—have wavered and seesawed between flexible reasonableness
17
interest-balancing all the way up to what looks like strict scrutiny.
It is high time to call out the assumption for the hazy moral intuition that it is and situate the moral intuition in law, and as law, insofar as it is supportable. Resting a protection—even a hazy hypothetical protection—on a moral intuition is dangerous from a pragmatic
as well as principled perspective. Moral intuitions are akin to “naïve
theories” and heuristics—error-prone and intuition-guided generalizations—that suffer from the manifold cognitive biases identified in
18
the judgment and decision making literature. Status quo bias is an
example of a cognitive bias with the potential to chill policy innovations if we persist in an intuitive, feels-wrong approach to determin19
ing violations. New ideas rouse vague feelings of unease and disquiet because they disrupt the status quo, to which we are intuitively
attached. We cannot always trust and use as a guide the affective
sense that a particular policy seems disquieting in the change it
wreaks. Moreover, inability to distinguish the chaff risks demeaning
an important guide and principle for understanding what the liberty
explicitly safeguarded by the Constitution means.
This Article argues that the work of privacy as a constitutional
concept is to adapt the idea of liberty in times of social change. Insofar as constitutionally relevant, the idea of informational privacy helps
further define, and should be informed by, the freedoms safeguarded
in the Constitution, such as the protections for liberty under procedural and substantive due process. There is a principled reason for
distinguishing between the cases of HIV and sexual orientation outings by the state with the aim of marring employment, family, and
friendships and cases where state employees want a job representing
an important public trust but do not want to get drug tested like the
rest of us. And it is more than the crude rule of thumb that we know
a violation when we feel it.
17

18

19

Compare Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (balancing an invasion
of privacy with the public interest) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967)), with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (writing that broad dissemination of medical information “would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests” (citations omitted)), and Mangels v.
Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying strict scrutiny). But see Nelson, 131 S.
Ct. at 759–60 (balancing interests and rejecting necessity standard).
See Jonathan Baron, A Psychological View of Moral Intuition, 5 HARV. REV. PHIL., 36, 36–39
(1995) (explaining that moral intuitions are heuristics and are akin to naïve theories vulnerable to cognitive biases and resultant errors and thus cannot be “the royal road to
moral truth”).
See infra Part II.
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the role of
privacy as a constitutional concept that helps calibrate the balance of
power between citizen and state—and the space for liberty—amid social change. This Part argues that privacy’s power is its ability to
hedge and gesture to many different constitutional interests, particularly liberty, thus allowing transition in vision to a richer conception
of liberty. Part II argues that the fog of standards surrounding the
amorphous assumed right of informational privacy points to the need
to translate into law the fuzzy moral intuitions surrounding the constitutional right. Part III explains how to translate our intuitions
about the right to informational privacy into respectable constitutional law that can better help screen out the manifold meritless
claims predicated on privacy as a knee-jerk reaction to any change in
the status quo rather than right and permit space for policy innovation by the political branches.
I. LIBERTY’S PRECURSOR: PRIVACY, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE
BALANCE OF POWER
Constitutional privacy law’s rapid growth in the twentieth century
demonstrates its plasticity and power in giving the judiciary a role in
managing the balance of power between citizen and state amid social
change. The affectively saturated prismatic concept of privacy has
been a vehicle for expressing and sometimes vindicating our yearning
for judicial intervention to curb the encroaching state, particularly in
times of social change. The jurisprudence of decisional privacy took
root in a time of social change in our sexual mores. The shadow jurisprudence of informational privacy that is still fumbling to take root
emerged and continues to unfurl in a time of disquiet over the shifting power and role of the state in an information society. The concept of privacy is powerful in times of change precisely because of its
prismatic nature to suggest an array of potential rationales during a
transitional moment regarding the full scope and nature of rights.
A. Decisional Privacy and Shifting Sexual Mores and Technologies
The first concept of constitutionalized privacy to take root arose
to calibrate the proper balance between the citizen and the state
amid changes in social mores and technological advances that the Facebook and sexting generation takes for granted—sexual liberation
and contraception. Sexual mores were in rapid evolution in the late
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1960s and 1970s. Chemical engineers had braved the disdain of the
scientific community for the “disreputable” line of research into birth
control and the prospect of religious boycotts and succeeded in developing hormonal contraceptives, bringing birth control under
women’s control and a matter of planning removed from the sex
21
act. Activists were advocating for autonomy outside the constraints
of traditional forms of marriage, motherhood, and the nuclear fami22
ly.
To gain a toehold and open up the transition in this time of foment, decisional privacy law got its start in the guise of safeguarding a
certain kind of sexual autonomy—that of the husband and wife. In
the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, finding a right to privacy
in the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments was about the right of a married couple to seek contra23
ceptive advice. At the outset of the opinion, Justice Douglas underscored in italics that this was a case about counseling “married persons”
about contraceptive devices and the challenged law criminalizing use
of a contraceptive device or aiding and abetting such use “operates
24
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.” He ruled that
the doctors prosecuted for providing advice had standing “to raise
the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a
professional relationship,” reasoning that otherwise “[t]he rights of
husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely
25
affected.” The model of monogamy was such a strong shaper of the
opinion that Justice Douglas reiterated that this case was about the
26
right of the “married” seven times.
Nowhere did the generally applicable criminal law target merely
27
married people. The challenged laws applied to “[a]ny person.”

20

21

22
23
24
25
26
27



See Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, Attitudes Toward Premarital, Extramarital, and
Homosexual Relations in the U.S. in the 1970s, 15 J. SEX RES. 108, 111–12, 117–18 (1979)
(examining the liberalization of American attitudes toward sexual relations).
See Claudia Flavell-While, Engineering the Sexual Revolution, CHEMICAL ENGINEER, June
2010, at 46, 47 (“The sexual revolution would have been impossible without a method of
contraception that was under the woman’s control and divorced from the sex act.”).
See John Leo, The Revolution Is Over, TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 74, 77 (discussing previously
popular activities of the Sexual Revolution).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Id. at 480, 482.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 480–86.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars Or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.”); id. at § 54-196 (“Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or
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But in the bold move of birthing a constitutional right to privacy, Justice Douglas took pains to portray the protection as about the intimacies of married life. In justifying the recognition of a right found nowhere explicitly in the Constitution, Justice Douglas analogized to
prior protection of the intimacies of family life. He first invoked
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which had recognized the parental right to
28
determine how to educate one’s children. He concluded by wrapping the newborn privacy right in the mantle of preserving the sacrosanct marital relationship:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a pur29
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Concurring, Justice Goldberg, writing for Justices Warren and Brennan, further characterized the unconstitutional intrusion as “upon
the right of marital privacy,” bringing the state into “the marital rela30
tion and the marital home.” He allied this notion of “marital privacy” with “the right . . . to marry, establish a home, and bring up child31
ren.” The constitutional right to privacy would be a respectable
monogamous one, closely allied to the autonomy of familial decisions—albeit perhaps a nascent one that wanted to exercise a little
control in determining when the family would come into being. It
was forged on the notion, earlier laid down in the childrearing autonomy cases of Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska, that there is a “private
32
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”
In this ode to marriage and the import of preserving the privacy
and intimacy of the marital relationship, nowhere was there mention
of the liberties of the libertines having sex outside marriage. The
Court was on the cusp of the “sexual revolution” that began in the

28
29
30
31
32

commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were
the principal offender.”).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (cited in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
Id. at 486, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 486, 488 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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33

“swinging 60s”—but not quite there yet. In the hang-ups and hangover of the straitlaced 1950s, premarital and extramarital sex were
frowned upon severely. Opinion polls in 1937 and 1959 reveal stability in negative attitudes toward premarital sex, with a majority of 55%
in 1937 and a majority of 54% in 1959 of people surveyed in a Roper
Poll indicating they did not believe it was acceptable for parties to a
34
marriage to have had previous sexual experience. The notion that
parties to a marriage be virgins seems quite remarkable today. Griswold left unclear whether the interests of the silent fraction of such
sexually active people were to be sub silentio left outside the scope of
the newly delineated privacy right. The Court did not answer the
question definitively until seven years later, in the 1972 case of Eisens35
tadt v. Baird.
By the end of the 1960s, premarital sex had come out of the
cloisters full-swing. Public opinion surveys indicate that approval of
premarital sex had begun rising in the 1960s and even out-of-wedlock
36
children had gained widespread acceptance by 1970. In 1969, a majority of people surveyed in a Gallup Poll—68.8%—still thought pre37
marital sex was wrong but by 1973 this view had dropped to 47%.
Approval of sex education in schools had been rising since the 1960s
and by the 1970s approval of teaching teens about birth control began rising, “reaching an approval level of more than 85%” by the
38
1980s. The rise in sexual permissiveness was cutting across racial,
class, and geographic lines and becoming a national cultural pheno39
menon.
In April 1967, the spring of the year some view as the start of the
40
sexual revolution, William R. Baird gave a lecture by invitation to
two thousand Boston University students about the relative merits of

33

34
35
36
37
38
39

40

See, e.g., Karl King et al., The Continuing Premarital Sexual Revolution Among College Females,
39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 455, 455 (1977) (stating the “premarital sexual revolution” began
in the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s); Tom W. Smith, The Sexual Revolution?, 54
PUB. OPINION Q. 415, 415 (1990) (reviewing media coverage and concluding that the
mass media “discovered” the sexual revolution in 1963–1964 and the revolution began in
the early 1960s).
Smith, supra note 33, at 421.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Smith, supra note 33, at 416–17.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 418.
See B. K. Singh, Trends in Attitudes Toward Premarital Sexual Relations, 42 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 387, 391 (1980) (discussing increasingly positive attitudes toward premarital sexual
relations across these population categories).
See, e.g., Erica Jong, Foreword to SEXUAL REVOLUTION, xxxvii (Jefferey Escoffier ed., 2003)
(marking 1967 as the start of the sexual revolution).
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41

various forms of contraception. He used various kinds of contraceptives as exhibits and after the lecture invited students up to help
42
themselves to the contraceptives. After he handed an “unmarried
adult woman a package of vaginal foam” he was arrested for violating
a felony provision of Massachusetts law criminalizing exhibiting or
43
giving away contraception-averting devices, drugs, or medicines. After Griswold, the law had an exception for physicians and pharmacists
dispensing contraceptives to married persons but Baird was not a
44
physician or pharmacist and the student was unmarried. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had read Griswold to mean that privacy surrounds the marital relationship—but the state remained free to regulate the “sexual lives of single persons” because of the legitimate state
45
interest in “discouraging . . . extra-marital relations.”
Reviewing Baird’s federal habeas petition, the First Circuit addressed the anomaly allowing state interference in the sexual lives of
unmarried but not married persons in ringing terms, making the issue one of “human rights”:
To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden
to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse,
means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of
support. Such a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of
sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human
46
rights.

Though noting the First Circuit’s ringing language, the Supreme
47
Court hedged and took a more conservative course, couching its decision upholding the right to contraception for the unmarried in the
logic of symmetry of rights and equal protection rationality between
48
the married and unmarried.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48

Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1969).
Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1399 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1399 & n.1 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21 (1992)).
Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d at 1399 n.1.
Sturgis v. Att’y Gen., 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970).
Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d at 1402.
See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 475–
78 (2010) (terming the analytical move in which the boundaries between the chosen basis of decision and a secondary rationale as “hedging”); see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial
Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 935 (2011) (noting that hedging “may plant
the seeds of an alternate rationale to blossom later, when the transition has been eased
with an approach that has a broader base of support at the time”).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (explaining that “whatever the rights of the
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike”).
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The newfound privacy right blossomed to fuller power and scope
49
a year later in Roe v. Wade. In Roe, women came out as plaintiffs to
50
speak for themselves. Two of the plaintiffs, Marsha and David King,
renamed Mary and John Doe, fit the married couple paradigm famil51
iar from the victory in Griswold v. Connecticut. The third plaintiff,
however, Norma McCorvey, represented the changing times and
needs—she was unmarried, pregnant, twenty-one years old and had
52
already given birth to two children and relinquished both.
The landmark privacy case of Roe v. Wade was decided under
Norma McCorvey’s pseudonym Jane Roe. Roe’s case challenged a
Texas statute that dated to 1857 and barred all abortions unless ne53
cessary to save the woman’s life. In Roe, the right to privacy that got
its early start arising from the sanctities and intimacies of the marital
54
relationship in Griswold morphed into something with much broader promise for the autonomy of all women, including unmarried
young pregnant women like Norma McCorvey:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. . . . Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and con55
tinuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.

Privacy had dramatically grown and changed posture to meet the
changes and new social needs of the 1960s and 1970s women’s rights
and sexual revolutions.
49
50
51

52
53
54
55

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 120 (describing plaintiff Jane Roe, “a single woman” who “wished to terminate
her pregnancy”).
See id. at 121 (introducing Mary and Jane Doe); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
(categorizing the appellants as a married couple); LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL,
BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT’S RULING 3–4, 22–25, 224 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010) (explaining the motivations and history behind the national effort to legalize the provision
of abortions).
GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 51, at 224.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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Privacy is a transitional lens that helps us view liberty in a new
light. It also helps in facilitating what Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai
56
have termed “hedging.” Hedging involves the blurring between a
palette of possible rationales to build consensus and plant the seeds
of alternate rationales when social support for a decision is uncertain
57
or rocky. The power of privacy as a transitional concept stems from
what is often portrayed as its greatest embarrassment—its ability to
gesture at and arise from different constitutional values and its “pro58
tean capacity to be all things to all lawyers.” A privacy rationale contains within it multiple potential avenues of rationales and implants a
proliferation—some might say confusion—of seeds with potential to
59
blossom.
After breaking ground, the idea of decisional privacy is discreetly
slipping off stage and liberty is coming to the forefront. Jamal
Greene would go further—he recently pronounced the demise of
constitutional privacy and the ascendancy of liberty as the operative
rationale for anchoring privacy’s enduring contributions to constitu60
61
tional law, pointing to Lawrence v. Texas as the “mortal blow.” In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, invalidated a Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy on substantive due process
grounds, to vindicate the liberty secured by the Due Process Clause of
62
the Fourteenth Amendment. Almost entirely eschewing the privacy
63
language prominent in Bowers v. Hardwick, including Justice White’s
famously curt rejection of the idea that the “right of priva64
cy . . . extends to homosexual sodomy,” Justice Kennedy instead un65
derscored that much deeper autonomy interests were at stake. He
wrote eloquently:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohi-

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 47, at 475–78.
Id. at 475–76.
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977).
See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1448 (1992)
(noting “the penumbral justification” is “much-maligued [sic]”).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 729–30 (2010).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 573–74.
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy
for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”).
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bit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
66
being punished as criminals.

Privacy may have stepped off center stage, but that was because it had
done its work in opening up the vision of liberty to include the
shared value of autonomy and space from the state to make autonomous decisions. Privacy was a lens that opened up the Court’s vision to the autonomy interest at stake and the impairment of liberty
when the State seeks to impinge on “the most private human con67
duct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”
B. Informational Privacy and the Management of Information as Power
From its start, informational privacy was linked to decisional privacy from the common concern of state interference with autonomy
of choice. In the foundational case that assumed a right to informational privacy, Whalen v. Roe, patients with opiate prescriptions sued
over a New York law requiring collection of identity data on purchasers of certain potentially dangerous prescription drugs such as co68
caine and methadone. The patients argued that they feared the
computerized data, despite safeguards, would be misused and that
69
they would “be stigmatized as drug addicts.”
The patients contended that the “mere existence . . . of the information” about their
use of the drugs roused fear that the information may become public
and hurt their reputations, rendering them “reluctant to use, and
some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use
70
is medically indicated.” While the patients apparently conceived of
decisional privacy and informational privacy as separate headings of
rights, the Court’s characterization of their argument shows the
shared concern was interference with their autonomy choice.
The linkage between privacy and autonomy is explicit in District
Court Judge Robert L. Carter’s learned opinion, which explained:
The concept of privacy is an affirmation of the importance of certain aspects of the individual and his desired freedom from needless outside interference. It is sometimes described as a sphere of space that a man may

66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
Id.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593, 595 (1977).
Id. at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 600.
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carry with him which is protected from unwarranted outside intrusion, as
the right of selected disclosures about oneself and as a right of personal
71
autonomy.

Judge Carter was influenced by Louis Henkin’s article Privacy and Autonomy. Henkin argued that privacy was a misnomer for what the
72
Court was recognizing. Henkin explained that “[w]hat the Supreme
Court has given us, rather, is something essentially different and
73
farther-reaching, an additional zone of autonomy.” As Amitai Etzioni has illuminated, privacy’s connotation of “exemption from scrutiny” heavily influenced by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s ca74
nonical The Right to Privacy is different from the Court’s
constitutional privacy jurisprudence, which is about “exemption from
75
control by the State.” Whalen shows why we might care about information disclosure and informational privacy as a constitutional matter—
76
because of the potential impingement on liberty of choice.
The potential impingement the Whalen plaintiffs alleged was speculative and indirect, however, because it was based on the potential
for data misuse—even though the statute had safeguards, including
criminalization of public disclosure of the identity of patients and
77
limits on who could access the database and for what purposes.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, while doctors had helped pioneer the decisional privacy cases in the contraception and abortion context, the
medical profession’s support of this informational privacy claim was
lukewarm. The section on psychiatry of the New York State Medical
Society apparently declined to support the suit though other physi78
cians’ associations joined.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the New York data-gathering program did not “pose a
sufficiently grievous threat to either [decisional or informational pri79
vacy] . . . to establish a constitutional violation.” The Court noted
71
72
73
74
75
76

77

78
79

Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419, 1424–26 (1974)).
Henkin, supra note 71, at 1410–11.
Id. at 1411.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Perspective on Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 897, 897 (2000).
Cf. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 555 (2006) (noting that
“Whalen illustrates how decisional interference relates to disclosure” and “how decisional
interference bears similarities to increased accessibility, since the existence of information in a government database can increase the potential accessibility of that information”).
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1977) (noting that “[w]illful violation of these
prohibitions” against public disclosure was “punishable by up to one year in prison and a
$2,000 fine”).
Id. at 595 n.16.
Id. at 600.
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that “an essential part of modern medical practice” involved health
information disclosures to public health agencies among other entities and cited as an example venereal disease reporting require80
ments.
The District Court had invalidated the New York program on the
ground that while it served a legitimate purpose, the scheme had “a
needlessly broad sweep” in identifying patients to prevent people
81
from amassing drugs to distribute illegally. In twenty months of operation, only one such case of a patient potentially going from doctor
82
to doctor to amass drugs had been identified. The court concluded
the yield was too small for the privacy price paid (neglecting that
benefits cannot just be denominated in transgressors caught because,
for example, cost-effective deterrence at the outset may also be a
83
benefit). The Supreme Court read the district court as imposing a
necessity requirement and underscored that there is no longer such
84
requirement. “State legislation which has some effect on individual
liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a
85
court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part,” the Court observed.
The Court also reiterated its frequent recognition “that individual
States have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to
86
problems of vital local concern.”
The Court thus demonstrated
concern at the outset in its informational privacy jurisprudence that
policy innovation among the States and political branches not be
chilled.
The Court concluded the prospect of harmful disclosure the
plaintiffs imagined was simply too remote and speculative. There was
no support for the “assumption that the security provisions [regarding the data would] . . . be administered improperly” and there was
only a “remote possibility” that judicially supervised evidentiary use of
the information might “provide inadequate protection against un87
warranted disclosures.” The Court also observed that the case was
weak because there was no indication “that any individual has been
deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 602 & n.29.
Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id.
Id. Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 n.21 (“The absence of detected violations does not, of
course, demonstrate that a statute has no significant deterrent effect.”).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 596–97.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 601–02.
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physician, to acquire and to use needed medication.” This was not a
case where “the State require[s] access to these drugs to be condi89
tioned on the consent of any state official or other third party.” Any
autonomy impingement was thus insufficiently substantial. Whalen
therefore concluded “neither the immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements . . . is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
90
Amendment.”
If the claim of impingement was so insubstantial, why did it give
the Court such pause? The Whalen Court’s concluding caveat both
sketched the potential right of informational privacy and explained
what roused the Court’s concern. Part IV of the Court’s opinion was:
91
“A final word about issues we have not decided.” The Court wrote:
“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
92
banks or other massive government files.” Noting the modern administrative state collected masses of data for an array of public purposes, from taxes, to welfare, to criminal justice and national security,
the Court observed that the power to collect data was “typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
93
unwarranted disclosures.” In an oft-cited sentence that has become
the foundation for the assumed right to informational privacy, the
Court concluded: “Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty
arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual’s in94
terest in privacy.”
Even back then, in the dawning of the information society, commentators were warning about the encroachment on liberty posed by
government data aggregation and the threat of disclosure. The
Court cited work by Arthur Miller arguing that while government data aggregation often serves salutary public purposes, the dark side is
monitoring of lawful dissidence and civil rights organizations such as
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 603.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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(“NAACP”) and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”). Miller was worried that such surveillance of lawful activities would chill
freedom of expression because of fear the information could be used
96
to harm or harass. Legislators and scholars of the era were worried
that the rise of digital dossiers were “an invitation to a police state or
97
return to McCarthyism.”
Under bombardment over its controversial decisional privacy opinions, the Court was not ready to engraft a new constitutional privacy
arm. Justice Stevens’ opinion for the majority hedging on the issue
left room to vindicate visions on either extremes, neatly captured by
the two concurring justices: Justice Brennan, a supporter of strong
strict scrutiny protection against unwarranted broad dissemination of
information and Justice Stewart, who opposed the notion of even the
98
existence of any such right. Whalen is written cryptically enough that
it can be read by learned individuals as either explicitly recognizing a
constitutional right to informational privacy or stopping short of
99
doing so.
Concurring in Whalen, Justice Brennan argued that broad dissemination by state officials of medical information “would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presuma100
bly be justified only by compelling state interests.”
Whalen was
decided in late February 1977. By the spring, in late June of the same
year, the Court issued another informational privacy decision, Nixon
101
v. Administrator of General Services.
This time, Justice Brennan was
writing for the majority. Amid the mishmash of standards and language in Nixon, what becomes clear is that Justice Brennan had to
stitch together different visions to make his majority on the issue of
95
96
97

98
99

100
101

Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 n.34 (citing Arthur Miller).
Miller, supra note 95, at 5–6.
Id. at 6; see Countryman, supra note 8, at 853–56 (noting the FBI’s surveillance and data
compiling activities). See generally Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of
Rights Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong. at 61–68 (1971) (expressing concerns over police surveillance).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Compare, e.g., Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (reading Whalen
and Nixon as “explicitly recogniz[ing] that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses
an ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’” (quoting Whalen, 429
U.S. at 599)) with William J. Winslade & Judith Wilson Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality, and
Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. REV. 578, 598 (1985) (reading Whalen as “stop[ping]
short of recognizing a constitutional right in informational privacy”).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–
56 (1973)).
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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whether there is a right to informational privacy and what standard
applies.
Nixon involved a suit by President Richard Nixon over legislation
directing an executive official to take custody of his Presidential pa102
pers and tape recordings. Among a grab bag of arguments, Nixon
claimed a right against disclosure of private information. He argued
that private papers were mixed in the collection, and archival screen103
ing to determine what should be returned violated the right. Writing for the majority in dismissing Nixon’s informational privacy
claim, Justice Brennan cited the flexible interest-balancing standard
from the Fourth Amendment administrative search and Terry stop
104
context.
He wrote that the “test” was that “any intrusion must be
weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential ma105
terials . . . to archival screening.”
Despite citing the government-deferential interest-balancing cases
from the Fourth Amendment context in defining his test, however,
Justice Brennan’s analysis of the facts of the case also used language
that drew on terms reminiscent of intermediate or strict scrutiny. He
concluded that “the archival review procedure involved here is designed to serve important national interests . . . and the unavailability
of less restrictive means necessarily follows from the commingling of
106
the documents.”
This blur of language may seem puzzling but it
was artful in that it planted a hook for potential strict scrutiny for the
fledgling twilight right brought into being that year.
Nixon’s case may seem a rather ironic one for the development of
a potential right of informational privacy against the surveillance
state disrupting the balance of power. He was, after all, the embodiment of the State obsessed with amassing information in stealth and
thereby aggregating power. Indeed, one is reminded of the irony of
the National Socialists on trial after World War II arguing that their
criminal prosecution violated the nullum crimen sine lege principle—
the idea that there can be no crime and punishment without preexisting law—when the National Socialists famously believed in the
principle of nullum crimen sine poena—no crime without punish-

102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 429, 459.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 458 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534–39 (1967)).
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
Id. at 464.
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107

ment. There was also a metaphoric power, however, to using Nixon’s case as a vehicle for planting the seeds of the protection. After
Watergate, the alarmist and seemingly somewhat paranoid vision of
the State amassing information to cement power and control seems a
lot less alarmist and paranoid. Rather, it brings into focus the risks
posed by information aggregation and why informational privacy may
be something a democracy and its central charter defining and calibrating the proper balance of power should care about.
II. THE FOG OF INDECISION: ON INTUITIONS AND EMOTIONS VERSUS
LAW
In producing decisions that could not quite decide if the constitutional right exists and offering a Rorschach blot of standards that
might govern if it did, the Court punted to the lower courts to sort
things out. The lower courts do not have the luxury of sifting and
carefully choosing where to grant certiorari. The coy suggestion that
a right exists without clarification has led to informational privacy
claims in a spate of suits challenging such socially useful policies as
financial disclosure requirements for government workers and legis108
lators to prevent corruption, or for officers, directors, and shareholders of taxi corporations to ensure sufficient funds in the event of
109
liability for serious injury, and background checks for police offic110
It has also been used to challenge
ers to ensure mental stability.
highly popular policies addressing serious public concerns and dangers such as sex offender proximity information under Megan’s
111
Law, and routine basic practices such as requiring bankruptcy fil107

108

109

110

111

See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, ON THE THREE TYPES OF JURISTIC THOUGHT 93 (Joseph W. Bedersky trans., 2004) (arguing that “the bold and imaginatively endowed criminal” could
rely on “the phrase nulla poena sine lege” to render the Rechtsstaat a “laughingstock”).
See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558–59 (2d Cir. 1983) (addressing government workers’ privacy rights in the context of financial disclosure policies); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (confronting the question of the extent of
the privacy rights state senators enjoy in the face of financial disclosure requirements).
Statharos v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1999) (seeking
a preliminary injunction to bar financial disclosure requirements “promulgated by the
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission”).
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 107 (3d Cir.
1987) (challenging the constitutionality of a questionnaire promulgated by the Police
Department regarding “applicants’ medical history, gambling habits and alcohol consumption”).
Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a resident’s privacy interests in his or her residence, for example a street name, was “substantially outweighed by
the state’s compelling interest in disclosing Megan’s Law information to the relevant public . . . [and] individuals within the court-authorized notification zone”).
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112

ings to indicate social security numbers.
Justice Scalia might cha113
racterize several of the claims as “utter silliness.”
Courts nonetheless have to treat even silliness seriously in the absence of a clear statement about whether there is a constitutional informational privacy right, and if so, its scope and applicable standards. And legislatures and administrative agencies enacting useful
policies must nonetheless operate within the fog of ambiguity and the
risk that an assumed right with unclear standards may lead to invalidation. If suits are brought even in the relatively less controversial
context of drug background checks and financial disclosure laws,
then governmental policies and actions in new contexts such as investigating and warning the public about a possible serial HIV spread114
er may be chilled by the vague possible constitutional right of informational privacy and its uncertain scope.
After all, in the confusion after Whalen and Nixon, a district court
even enjoined the Department of Defense (“DOD”) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) from administering questionnaires asking about illegal drug use and financial history, among other issues, to employees in positions of public trust in
115
order to protect against the risk of misconduct. The questionnaire
vetted people in sensitive positions “involving policymaking, major
program responsibility, law enforcement duties, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust; and positions involving
access to or operation or control of unclassified confidential or financial records, with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage
116
or realizing a significant personal gain.”
112

113

114

115

116

See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (agreeing that “indiscriminate public
disclosure of [Social Security Numbers] . . . may implicate the constitutional right to informational privacy”).
See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing claims by
NASA government contractors trying to avoid a background screen for drug testing and
treatment based on a claimed constitutional right to information privacy as “utter silliness” and “[r]idiculous”).
Cf. Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 531, 531–32 (2011) (proposing preventative privacy-piercing for repeat STD
spreaders to enable better-informed consent to sex when need outweighs privacy concerns); Jeffrey D. Klausner et al., Tracing a Syphilis Outbreak Through Cyberspace, 284 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 447 (2000) (discussing the challenges of investigating and alerting the public
to a potential chatroom user linked to an outbreak of several syphilis and HIV cases).
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Perry, 944 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1996); Am.
Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 924 F. Supp. 225
(D.D.C. 1996), rev’d, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 398
(Jan. 5, 1996) (codified at 5 C.F.R. § 731.302 (1996)).
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Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit reversed the order enjoining the DOD
and HUD from conducting basic checks on appointees to such sensitive positions of public trust. The D.C. Circuit began its “analysis by
expressing [its] . . . grave doubts as to the existence of a constitution117
al right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information.”
The Court would have preferred simply to make clear that such a
right did not exist, but was inhibited from doing so by the “recurring
dicta” by the Supreme Court, which the D.C. Circuit surmised ad118
dressed the issue without resolving it. Remarkably, Whalen and Nixon were not only unclear as to whether the right existed, but also
whether it was recognizing the right or just assuming it.
The D.C. Circuit quoted at length and approvingly from the decision of the Sixth Circuit, which also expressed doubt that any such
right existed and was troubled by the ramifications if the judiciary
were to breathe life into such a notion as a constitutional matter.
The Sixth Circuit in J.P. v. DeSanti, a case oft-cited in the informational privacy jurisprudence, opined:
Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to
some degree . . . . Courts called upon to balance virtually every government action against the corresponding intrusion on individual privacy
may be able to give all privacy interests only cursory protection. The
Framers rejected a provision in the Constitution under which the Supreme Court would have reviewed all legislation for its constitutionality.
They cannot have intended that the federal courts become involved in an
inquiry nearly as broad—balancing almost every act of government, both
state and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual privacy.
Inferring very broad “constitutional” rights where the Constitution itself
does not express them is an activity not appropriate to the judiciary. In
this context, we note that of the cases cited holding that there is a constitutional right to nondisclosure of private information, none cites a con119
stitutional provision in support of its holding.

Despite expressing its misgivings and view that no such right existed, the D.C. Circuit nonetheless followed the tack of the Supreme
Court in assuming without deciding, because even if the right existed,
120
the plaintiff’s claim did not state a violation.
Sorting through the suits over the decades, the majority of the
federal courts of appeals and a number of state courts have gone further and accorded the idea of informational privacy constitutional
117
118
119
120

AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 791.
Id.
J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoted in AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at792–93).
AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 793.
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stature.
A constitutional right created out of fog cannot help but
be murky in its application and in terms of what standards apply,
however. The guessing games that courts are forced to play regarding what potential standard applies to the assumed right are sometimes downright embarrassing. Consider, for example, the Second
Circuit’s guessing game over the right standard:
The nature and extent of the interest recognized in Whalen and Nixon,
and the appropriate standard of review for alleged infringements of that
interest, are unclear. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087–91 (6th
Cir.1981) (questioning whether Whalen and Roe created any general right
to non-disclosure of personal information against which infringing gov121

See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (reading
Whalen as recognizing a privacy right against the “divulgence of highly personal information”); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that there is
a constitutional right of information privacy that protects against disclosure of information such as health records); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding
a clearly established information nondisclosure right for the purposes of vitiating qualified immunity in a suit based on employment termination for refusal to authorize an extensive background check of a teacher at state-run program for drop-outs); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the Constitution protects an
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” referred to generally by
courts as the right to “informational privacy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James
v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1543–44 (11th Cir. 1991) (vitiating qualified immunity
in a suit alleging a violation of the constitutional right to information privacy); Walls v.
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (reading Whalen as recognizing that
the constitutional right to privacy also extends to the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting
that “as of June 1983 a majority of courts considering the question had concluded that a
constitutional right of confidentiality is implicated by disclosure of a broad range of personal information, [though] courts were not unanimous in that view”); Mangels v. Pena,
789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (reading Whalen and Nixon to signify that there is an
information privacy right protected by strict scrutiny); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that most courts “appear to agree that privacy of personal matters is a protected interest . . . and that some form of intermediate scrutiny or
balancing approach is appropriate as the standard of review” and applying such intermediate scrutiny to a financial disclosure requirement for government employees), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132–34 (5th Cir. 1978)
(indicating the Court has recognized another strand of the right to privacy, “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” albeit remaining unclear as to the
standard that applies to the right (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Paternity of
K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (reading Whalen as signifying that the Supreme Court has “recognized a constitutional right to information privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . though its contours continue to be refined” (internal citations omitted)). But see, e.g., AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 793 (expressing doubt about a general
constitutional protection for nondisclosure, though assuming without reaching a conclusion); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that to violate
the constitutional right of privacy based on disclosure “the information disclosed must be
either a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation . . . or a flagrant breech of a
pledge of confidentiality”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (expressing doubt about “very broad constitutional” protections against the disclosure of confidential information (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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ernment actions have to be balanced). Most courts considering the question, however, appear to agree that privacy of personal matters is a protected interest . . . and that some form of intermediate scrutiny or balancing approach is appropriate as a standard of review . . . . The Supreme
Court itself appeared to use a balancing test in Nixon . . . . Moreover, an
intermediate standard of review seems in keeping both with the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to recognize new fundamental interests requiring a
high degree of scrutiny for alleged infringements, and the Court’s recognition that some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is necessary
122
to safeguard the confidentiality interest.

It hardly becomes the dignity of an appellate court to have to say
maybe it is intermediate scrutiny, maybe it is balancing, maybe strict
scrutiny (though unlikely) and maybe rational relation (though
probably more). A “law” hardly merits the honorary appellation if
courts must first guess at whether it exists and then feel around for
what standard seems to apply among a menu of very different standards. If this is true for mere law, it is all the more troubling for a
constitutional right. It hardly becomes the dignity of a constitutional
right for courts to have to speculate as to whether it even exists, and
further speculate as to what standard applies if it does.
What is also problematic for policy innovation in the laboratories
123
of the states and political branches to meet new challenges is that
some courts have appeared to apply strict scrutiny, or, at least the
language of strict scrutiny in evaluating claims. Thus, for example,
the Tenth Circuit in Mangels v. Pena has read Whalen to mean that the
Due Process Clause protects against disclosure of certain personal
matters and forbids disclosure of certain information unless it “advance[s] a compelling state interest which, in addition, must be ac124
complished in the least intrusive manner.”
Other courts have applied a form of intermediate scrutiny or at least the language of
125
intermediate scrutiny.
Because of the mixed language in the
Court’s cases, it is understandable why courts may, out of caution,
migrate toward the higher standard suggested by the language to
hedge their bets in the event their case is the one where the Court finally grants certiorari to decide whether the right exists and what
122
123

124

125

Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) (“We have long recognized the role of
the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.” (citing New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839; cf. Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the interest of sex offenders in keeping their addresses hidden “is substantially
outweighed by the state’s compelling interest”).
See, e.g., Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559 (concluding that Supreme Court precedent and prior
case law support intermediate scrutiny).
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standard applies. Yet, beyond being a wish of Justice Brennan in a
concurrence in Whalen and suggestive flourishes in his opinion for
the majority in Nixon, strict or even intermediate scrutiny does not
find much support in the dicta on which the assumed right and its
hypothetical standard are founded. As the Sixth Circuit observed, all
sorts of regulations to further the community interest may arguably
affect privacy interests. To suggest the threat of strict or intermediate
scrutiny is to chill policy innovation. Moreover, civil libertarians who
want strong protection for privacy may have cause to be concerned
that heightened scrutiny leads to potential front-end deterrence in
recognizing privacy interests lest the tough scrutiny apply. This dilution would impact not only judicial recognition but the politics of
recognition in the legislative arena, where protections are best calibrated and crafted.
I have written elsewhere about some of the dialogue-inducing and
deliberation-triggering virtues of standards that have blurry boundaries to give political actors incentive to evaluate whether their actions
126
fit within the scope of the standards. A standard with blurry boundaries for a clear right such as the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is far different, however, than
a quasi-constitutional law of assumed rights with no clear standard. It
is salutary, particularly in certain sensitive gray areas where legislative
actions push against the scope of constitutional safeguards, to have
legislatures deliberate over whether the actions cross the line in view
of a standard. It is innovation-chilling and unprincipled, however, to
simply have courts guess at whether a right exists or not—even sometimes abrogating qualified immunity to vindicate the assumed right—
and further guess or pick what standards might apply.
Such a quasi-constitutional law of assumptions without defined
standards casts the courts adrift to try to discern whether there may
be violations of a hypothetical right. Lower courts have observed,
it is not clear from Whalen whether, to be constitutionally protected by a
right of nondisclosure, personal information must concern an area of life
itself protected by either the autonomy branch of the right of privacy or
by other fundamental rights or whether, to the contrary, the right of confidentiality protects a broader array of information than that implicated
127
by the autonomy branch of the right of privacy.

The result may be that while we cannot define the right, or what it
covers, or the standard, or what a violation would be, we sometimes
126
127

See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV.
101 (forthcoming 2012) (exploring the utility of uncertainty).
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1987).
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know it when we see it because it feels wrong and we want to provide
protection and give a remedy.
The result is a puzzling mishmash jurisprudence. Our medical
and disease information feels deeply private and is usually protected,
requiring interest-balancing or maybe even passing intermediate or
128
strict scrutiny before disclosure —unless one is a prisoner. Disclosure of a prison inmate’s HIV status or the contents of a psychological
evaluation may or may not implicate the constitutional right to in129
formational privacy —but we are surer the right applies and is violated when we think corrections officers are being irresponsible
130
jerks about it.
Revealing to the public details disclosed in the
course of an investigation is not a violation of the constitutional right
131
to informational privacy —except sometimes, particularly if we think
128

129

130

131



See, e.g., Norman–Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding there is a protected informational privacy interest in test results related to
syphilis, pregnancy and the sickle cell trait); Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding there is a protected informational privacy interest in HIV/AIDS test results); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection.”); see also Anita L. Allen, Confidentiality: An Expectation in Health Care, in PENN
CENTER GUIDE TO BIOETHICS 127, 128 (Vardit Ravitsky et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the
deeply held feeling among the polity that medical information should be private).
See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt about
whether seropositive inmates have constitutional privacy rights that protect against the
disclosure of their medical records or information as part of prison safety screenings);
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the disclosure of a prison inmate’s HIV-positive status does not violate a constitutional right to privacy). Compare
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991) (assuming “arguendo that seropositive prisoners enjoy some significant constitutionally-protected privacy interest in preventing the non-consensual disclosure of their HIV-positive diagnoses”) with Dean v.
Roane Gen. Hosp., 578 F. Supp. 408, 409 (S.D. W. Va. 1984) (holding that a sheriff’s disclosure of a prisoner’s medical records indicating his diabetic condition did not violate a
constitutional right to privacy).
See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “gratuitous
disclosure of an inmate’s confidential medical information as humor or gossip—the apparent circumstance of the disclosure in this case—is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, and it therefore violates the inmate’s constitutional right to
privacy” though the right was not clearly established enough at the time to vitiate qualified immunity).
See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Port Huron, 507 F.3d 364, 365–66, 369 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
“there is no constitutional right to privacy for a criminal suspect who claims that ‘the
State may not publicize a record of an official act’” and thus there was no privacy violation
where personal information of an undercover deputy sheriff and his wife was released to
the public in the course of an investigation into a drunken driving accident (quoting Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976))); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 206 (3d
Cir. 1991) (finding there is no constitutionally protected privacy interest in information
disclosed in police report); Olivera v. Vizzusi, No. CIV. 2:10-1747 WBS GGH, 2011 WL
1253887, at *1, *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding police officers have no rights to
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132

the police are behaving badly. This jurisprudence of constitutional
intuitions is so steered by the feels-wrong approach, that the Sixth
Circuit, the biggest hold-out in recognizing the assumed constitu133
tional right of informational privacy, has, nonetheless recognized a
violation based on disclosure—albeit characterized as a violation of a
“fundamental right of privacy”—in a case of disclosure of details of a
134
rape disclosed to police.
Even though the Sixth Circuit had previously held that disclosure of details given to police in the course of
an investigation does not implicate a privacy right, the court was quite
evidently offended by the facts of the case, wherein a sheriff allegedly
disclosed humiliating facts of the rape to the public after the victim
135
criticized his investigation.
In the absence of law and defined standards, a constitutional jurisprudence of intuitions has arisen in the lower courts. The Eighth
Circuit’s standard is perhaps the most open about the affectively influenced unconstitutional-if-it-feels-wrong test. The Eighth Circuit
has held that “‘the information disclosed must be either a shocking
degradation or an egregious humiliation . . . or a flagrant breach of a
pledge of confidentiality’” to violate the constitutional right of priva136
cy. The Eighth Circuit has also openly identified the affectively influenced intuition that helped give rise to the potential constitutional
right to informational privacy. The Eighth Circuit explained in Eagle
v. Morgan, “the Supreme Court foresaw on the horizon abuses that
might emanate from governmental collection of vast amounts of personal data . . . . We echo these concerns. It is disquieting to think
that [the governmental actors engaged in the actions alleged in the
137
case].”
The quasi-constitutional law of informational privacy that
has arisen is a shadow constitutional law of intuitions founded on the

132

133
134
135
136
137

information privacy in information uncovered in an investigation into their potential
misconduct); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (declining to enlarge the notion of constitutionally protected privacy to prevent police from publicizing the “record
of an official act such as an arrest”); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 100–01, 105–07 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that the leak of grand jury information to the press by a prosecutor was
not actionable because the release of stigmatizing information does not establish a due
process claim).
See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686–87 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a potential constitutional violation of the right to privacy but not of a clearly established right sufficient to vitiate qualified immunity, though warning “public officials in this circuit will now be on
notice that such a privacy right exists”).
See supra text accompanying note 119.
Bloch, 156 F.3d at 686.
Id. at 676.
Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d
1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original).
Id. at 627.
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sensation of disquiet over possible governmental overreaching amid
138
social change.
Intuition is a double-edged sword in steering our judgments. A
new wave of social psychology has shed insights on how intuition and
139
affect subtly steer our perception, judgment, and decision making.
Intuition can be a powerful guide to steering judgment, because it
incorporates the insights of experience that may be hard to translate
140
into words.
Indeed studies have indicated that the calls of nurses
on impending heart failure, or chess masters on the right move, or
ball players are better when steered by intuition and instinct and may
be hard to reduce to words or even marred when an explanation is
141
required. But intuitions, and the emotions that affect them, can also lead us astray. Intuitions are shaded by what Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Paul Slovic have dubbed “the affect heuristic,” the
idea that our judgment of a situation is impacted by our emotional
reaction to it, or at a level of reaction even before emotion, the gen142
eral sense of goodness or badness about it.
Moral intuitions also
suffer from the general problems with heuristics and biases—
cognitive rules of thumb that may lead us astray. Jonathan Baron has
analyzed how overvaluation of the status quo—and greater demands
for justification when the status quo is changed, termed status quo bi-

138

139

140
141

142

See also, Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194–95 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In the past few
decades, technological advances have provided society with the ability to collect, store,
organize, and recall vast amounts of information about individuals in sophisticated computer files. This database capability is already being extensively used by the government,
financial institutions, and marketing research firms to track our travels, interests, preferences, habits, and associates. Although some of this information can be useful and even
necessary to maintain order and provide communication and convenience in a complex
society, we need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse. Some information still needs
to be private, disclosed to the public only if the person voluntarily chooses to disclose
it.”).
See, e.g., Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, Judgment and Decision Making: The
Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION
RESEARCH 327, 327–29 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) (setting forth
a theory on the role of affect in judgment and decision making that is supported with
empirical research).
Preface to INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING ix (Henning Plessner et al. eds.,
2008).
See generally ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION (2001) (collecting such studies);
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2003) (same); Markus Raab & Joseph G. Johnson, Implicit
Learning as a Means to Intuitive Decision Making in Sports, in INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING supra note 140 (analyzing the phenomenon in the context of sports);
see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 13, 29,
39 (2005) (describing the process as rapid cognition and offering myriad examples).
Finucane et al., supra note 139, at 340–41.
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as—can impact people’s moral decisions in potentially irrational
143
Baron has accordingly warned against reliance on moral inways.
144
tuitions to guide us to the right result. If moral intuitions are not
145
the “royal road to moral truth” they cannot be the foundation for
creating a broad amorphous constitutional right, at least unclothed
in colorable constitutional text.
III. PRIVACY’S LENS: SEEING THE SUPPLE TEXT WE HAVE, NOT
INVENTING ANEW
Whither forward? After thirty-three years of letting the constitutional right of informational privacy live a vigorous life by assumption
in the lower courts, the Supreme Court recently decided again not to
146
decide whether the right exists in NASA v. Nelson. Noting the government had not asked the Court to find there is no constitutional
right to informational privacy, the Court declined to consider the
question, instead following the approach of Whalen and Nixon of as147
suming without deciding that the right existed to dispose of a claim.
The Court therefore declined to render legitimate (or not) the jurisprudence of quasi-constitutional law based on assumption.
Despite the odd posture of fleshing out and clarifying the applicable standard (for a potentially nonexistent right), NASA v. Nelson
did help introduce some more clarity to the standard that should apply if the right exists. The Court noted: “We reject the argument
that the Government, when it requests job-related personal information in an employment background check, has a constitutional burden to demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least re148
strictive means of furthering its interests.” The Court thus defused
Justice Brennan’s planting of the strict scrutiny possibility in his Whalen concurrence and in some of the suggestive language in his majori149
ty opinion in Nixon.
In doing so, the Nelson court ameliorated but did not altogether
cure the potential for chilling policy innovations in the laboratories
143

144
145
146
147
148
149

See generally JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC
DECISION MAKING (1998) (discussing myriad examples of the impact of status quo bias);
see also Jonathan Haidt & Selin Kesebir, In the Forest of Value: Why Moral Intuitions Are Different, in INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING supra note 140, at 210 (collecting
studies).
Baron, supra note 18, at 39–40.
Id. at 38.
131 S. Ct. 746, 756 & n.10 (2011).
Id. at 756 n.10.
Id. at 760.
See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text and references.
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of the states and political branches. Taking the prospect of strict
scrutiny out of the picture, at least in the background check context,
is salutary. But the substantial ambiguity over the scope and contours
of the standard remain a significant chilling factor. As Justice Scalia
argued, the Court’s context-specific analysis of a claim that, at any
rate, was “utter silliness” leaves ample room for distinguishing any
150
limits. What if at issue is not background checks but a carefully calibrated program of disease control and information-sharing with safeguards, for example?
In playing on the theme of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Whalen,
which characterizes the interest in informational privacy as a hypothetical constitutional right, I do not mean to undervalue it. I believe
that Justice Scalia’s vigorous arguments that the Court has the duty to
say what the law is on this important issue are compelling and convincing. I have made two more arguments in favor of correcting the
murk of indecision, the first based on how indecision and ambiguity
chills policy innovation in the laboratories of the states and political
branches and the second based on the need to enunciate a standard
by which courts can consistently and coherently sort the cases and
151
translate intuition into law. But Justice Scalia also believes that we
should leave informational privacy to the political branches to cali152
brate. In Justice Scalia’s view, there is no right to informational privacy, period, so courts should stop sounding off.
In contrast, I argue that the idea of informational privacy has a
constitutional role to play and is not merely a good idea for the political branches to implement alone. As Anita Allen has illuminated,
privacy is more than a popular preference but a “foundational good
to which liberal societies must have a substantive commitment, as
153
they do to freedom and equality.” This Article has argued that the
protean idea of privacy is a lens that helps bring into focus the meaning of the supple text of the Constitution. As a constitutional concept, privacy suffers from the frequent charge that it is an atextual invention. I believe the course of privacy’s career in constitutional law
150
151
152

153

Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 769 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See discussion supra at notes 108–45.
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would simply hold that there is no
constitutional right to ‘informational privacy.’ Besides being consistent with constitutional text and tradition, this view has the attractive benefit of resolving this case without
resort to the Court’s exegesis on the Government’s legitimate interest in identifying contractor drug abusers and the comfortingly narrow scope of NASA’s ‘routine use’ regulations.”).
Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy: The Case for Government Mandates, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 87, 93 (2007).
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has shown it not to be a standalone atextual invention, but rather a
concept that helps enrich our understanding of the freedoms expli154
citly safeguarded in the Constitution.
The provenance of privacy in constitutional law has been a matter
of embarrassment, sometimes elided or only alluded to in the way polite company referred to illegitimacy in the days of old. But the embarrassment of privacy in constitutional law arises only if it is regarded as a separate stand-alone right lacking a textual anchor. In
contrast, the course of privacy’s career in constitutional law indicates
it is a concept rich with meaning that lubricates and keeps supple our
understanding of the terms and ideas enshrined in the Constitution.
There is no need to invent; the Constitution’s terms are supple
enough, if only we are able to see them. Privacy describes interests
and harms that open up our vision so we can better implement and
vindicate the Constitution’s freedoms and protections as social contexts change.
The standards that apply to the manifold and myriad contexts
lumped for adjudication under the hypothetical right of informational privacy depend, therefore, on the particular transgression alleged. Take, for example, the cases where state actors egregiously
and aggressively out someone’s disease status. In Doe v. Borough of
Barrington, for example, police officers learned about the HIVpositive status of the plaintiff’s husband during a traffic stop when he
warned them not to touch him because he had HIV and “weeping le155
sions.” The defendant officer Smith told the plaintiff Does’ neighbors, the DiAngelos, about Mr. Doe’s HIV status, and told Mrs. DiAn156
Mrs.
gelo that she should use disinfectant to protect herself.
DiAngelo, a school district employee who had children in school with
the Doe children, became upset and contacted the media and other
parents, some of whom withdrew their children from school rather
157
than allowing them to be educated alongside the Doe children.
The District of New Jersey vitiated qualified immunity and allowed a
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed on the theory that
the officer’s disclosure violated the privacy rights of Mr. Doe and his
158
family.
In characterizing this case as one about the constitutional
154

155
156
157
158

In this regard, the First Circuit in Borucki v. Ryan aptly traced the constitutional right to
information privacy to “the autonomy branch of the privacy right.” 827 F.2d 836, 841 n.8
(1st Cir. 1987). As I argued in Part I, the “autonomy branch of the privacy right” is in
turn about enriching our understanding of the meaning of liberty. See supra Part I.B.
729 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 382.
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right to informational privacy, the court remarkably held that a right
not yet even definitively held to exist is clearly established.
Our intuitions tell us in these cases that surely there should be
some protection against such disturbing governmental conduct in the
Constitution and a remedy. The question is how to translate intuitions of justice into respectable law. The answer is that the Due
Process Clause and its jurisprudence on informational branding supplies an answer—or at least safeguards to curb such official misconduct.
Part of the unease with how much information the State can disclose may be concern over the amplified voice and authority of the
159
State.
In many circumstances, the State does not merely disclose
information; it brands individuals with a mark of disgrace. Informational branding by the State has a long history, both literary and actual. It is not categorically unconstitutional. Indeed, sometimes such
information disclosure may serve important social interests. But the
Court has long held that some process is due before “such a stigma or
160
badge of disgrace” may be affixed by the State.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau is illustrative. At issue in Constantineau was a remarkable form of community policing to deal with the social ills and externalities wreaked by
someone who “by excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors, or fermented malt beverages . . . expose[s] himself or family to want,” or
imposes on the community the burden of supporting him or his fami161
ly, or endangers the safety and health of himself or others. Under
the Wisconsin law, “the wife of such person” and other officials, including the Chief of Police or the District Attorney, “may, in writing
signed by her, him or them, forbid all persons knowingly to sell or
give away to such person any intoxicating liquors or fermented malt
162
beverages, for the space of one year.” In Constantineau’s case, the
Hartford Chief of Police ordered the dissemination of notices to all
Hartford retail liquor outlets forbidding sale of liquor to him without
163
prior notice or hearing where he had an opportunity to be heard.
The question was what process is due before the State attaches
164
“such a stigma or badge of disgrace.” The Court ruled:

159
160
161
162
163
164

I thank Jason Schulz for raising this concern at a workshop.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
Id. at 434 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. §176.26 (West 1967)).
Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.26 (West 1967)).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
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Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. “Posting” under the Wisconsin Act may to
some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an official
branding of a person. The label is a degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at all. This appellee
was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have been the victim of an official’s caprice. Only when the whole proceedings leading to
the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive re165
sults be prevented.

No justice thought a naked delegation of power to “a man’s wife [and
166
other minor officers]” to so shame him and restrict his liberty without prior notice and hearing was constitutional on its face. The three
dissenting justices mainly wanted to afford state courts an opportuni167
ty to first construe the statute and perhaps narrow it. Justice Black,
joined by Justice Blackmun, underscored the sentiment of the Court
deploring the grant of “such arbitrary and tyrannical power in the
hands of minor officers and others” and likened it to a bill of attainder that “can be issued ex parte, without notice or hearing of any kind
168
or character.” He dissented because he wanted to give the Wisconsin Supreme Court the first shot at invalidating the statute, explaining, “[i]t is impossible for me to believe that the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin would uphold any such boundless power over the lives and
169
liberties of its citizens.”
As for the HIV-outing cases in the prison inmate contexts, as the
Seventh Circuit has suggested, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment would prevent prison officials from
“disseminat[ing] humiliating but penologically irrelevant details of a
170
prisoner’s medical history.” Indeed, in one such case of “gratuitous
165

166
167

168
169
170

Id. at 437. Interestingly, in this vein, the Whalen Court cited Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion in Utz v. Cullinane, wherein Judge Wright observed: “Due process obligates the government to accord an individual the opportunity to disprove potentially damaging allegations before it disseminates information that might be used to his detriment.” 520 F.2d
467, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (cited in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 n.34 (1977)).
Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 444.
See Constantineau, 400 U.S.. at 440 (Burger, J., dissenting) (predicating the dissent on the
possibility that the Wisconsin courts, which had not yet ruled on the validity of the statute
at issue, could find that the statute violates the state constitution, thus eliminating the
need to rule on the issue of federal constitutionality); id. at 443–44 (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that where the state court might confine the state law’s meaning so as not to
have any constitutional infirmity, the case should be remanded with directions to withhold court proceedings to enable appellee to file a state court action challenging the validity of the statute).
Id. at 444.
Id.
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1995).
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disclosure of an inmate’s confidential medication information”—that
she was an HIV-positive transsexual—for “humor or gossip,” the
Second Circuit found an informational privacy violation, but it was
171
the Eighth Amendment that did the remedial work.
The Second
Circuit explained that the right to confidentiality in medical information varies with condition but is at its zenith when it comes to HIV sta172
tus and secret transsexualism.
The choice to allow others to know of one’s disease status and
sexual identity is a choice one makes for oneself, not a decision that
173
the State makes for us, the Second Circuit reasoned.
The Second
Circuit distinguished this right of “confidentiality” from “the right to
autonomy and independence in decision making for personal mat174
ters.” But the root interest—why the law should care—is about the
denial of the basic liberty of intimate decision making. Ultimately,
the Second Circuit recognized a right to the confidentiality of medical information but held the right was not sufficiently “clearly estab175
lished” to vitiate qualified immunity.
But the Second Circuit concluded that under certain circumstances, the state’s outing of an HIVpositive prisoner—particularly accompanied by the outing of transsexualism—put the prisoner at substantial risk of harm, thereby violating clearly established Eighth Amendment law and overriding
176
qualified immunity.
The Second Circuit based its Eighth Amendment holding on the risk of violence by other inmates due to the dis177
The informational privacy lens also magnifies other asclosure.
pects of the harm based on the daily humiliation, ridicule, and
harassment even short of serious physical injury by stripping Devilla
of the basic autonomy to decide whether and to whom she would reveal her transsexualism and HIV status. The informational privacy
lens also helps magnify the risk as sufficient to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment even before the harm of serious physical injury
occurs. We need not invent new rights to vindicate our sense of justice.

171
172
173
174
175
176

177

Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 114.
See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the pre-existing law made it sufficiently clear that the
Eighth Amendment barred prison officials from disclosing an inmate’s transsexualism in
certain situations where it could be reasonably foreseen that such disclosure would subject the plaintiff to inmate-on-inmate violence).
Id. at 115.
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What about intrusive background checks, or indiscriminate disclosure of medical information, or financial disclosure laws? Some of
the lower courts have indicated that the assumed right of constitutional privacy is implicated by such laws—but they have passed muster
under even heightened intermediate scrutiny given the nature of the
privacy interest on the one hand and the often important public in178
terest on the other.
In these domains, populist privacy can do far
more than the Court in calibrating the right balance. But where the
political branches disturb the status quo balance of power in terms of
what we may hold secret from the State sufficiently to present issues
implicating liberty, then due process balancing of interests would be
implicated. Here, again, informational privacy is a lens to help us see
how information is power, and how certain liberty-invasive forms of
mandated disclosure may disrupt the balance of power and thereby
warrant due process interest-balancing.

178

See, e.g., Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that even assuming a prison inmate about to be released has a right to privacy of medical information, disclosure of medical information obtained for civil commitment purposes does not
violate any such right); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 948–49, 956–58 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a mandate which required teachers at a state-run, federally-funded program
for high school drop-outs to release medical records for background check violated students’ right of confidentiality, although granting qualified immunity to director for required authorization for release of financial records); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188, 189–90, 192–94 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that background check questionnaire
for city police department employee contained questions that implicated the privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, but allowing the policy to pass muster
because the city had a compelling interest in checking its police and had exercised sufficient caution to prevent disclosure); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1556, 1559,
1564 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that financial disclosure laws affecting city employees making $25,000 or more passed intermediate scrutiny in light of the city’s interests in preventing corruption and conflicts of interest); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638
F.2d 570, 572, 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that while mandated disclosure of medical records to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health implicated constitutional privacy interests, such mandate passed muster under the balancing test); Plante
v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1121–22, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) (balancing interests and ruling
that financial disclosure laws for state senators pass muster). But see, e.g., Lee v. City of
Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 248, 261 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that sick leave procedure that
required city employees to state nature of illness to supervisors did not implicate any informational privacy right recognized by the Sixth Circuit); Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 107, 112–18 (3d Cir. 1987) (balancing
interests and ruling that background questionnaire for Special Investigations police applicants that asked intrusive intimate questions without data protections may unconstitutionally impinge on the applicant’s privacy interest under an interest-balancing test).
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CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s text is robust and supple enough to capture
the most concerning harms that arouse our intuitive sense of wrong
that the lower courts have been cramming into the assumed constitutional right of informational privacy. There is no need to persist in a
jurisprudence of assumption for fear that the pressures of advances in
technology and other new social challenges have exposed gaps that
we need to fix through a secondary structure of a quasi-constitutional
law of posturing.
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,” the Court
has penned eloquently, in another context where privacy had laid the
groundwork for a richer understanding of liberty, and then slipped
179
off-stage once an enriched vision of liberty could come to the fore.
It is time to dispel the doubt and allow a richer vision of the meanings of constitutional freedoms to come to the fore, brought into focus by the lens of informational privacy, not as an invented right, but
as a way to see how supple and well-suited for governing through social change the Constitution’s text is.
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Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).

